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Introduction
If dramatic future climate changes are to be avoided, there must be a significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions compared with the "business as usual" development of emissions. Moreover, a significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions will require (i) cooperation among countries and (ii) development of new technology if such reductions are to be achieved without excessive costs. The interaction between the design of international climate agreements and endogenous technology development is therefore an important issue.
Several recent articles have studied interactions between endogenous technological change and environmental policy, see e.g. Jaffe et al. (2002) and Löschel (2002) for overviews. Most of the contributions dealing explicitly with the climate problem neglect interactions between countries, and simply consider the world as one unit with a central planner.
1 There is, however, a literature that focuses explicitly on interactions between countries in a context of endogenous technology development, see Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1994) , Xepapadeas (1995) , Katsoulacos (1997) , Buonanno et al. (2003) , Rosendahl (2002) and Ben Youssef (2003) .
Two papers by Carraro and Marchiori (2003) and Buchner and Carraro (2004) are particularly relevant for the issues discussed in the present paper. In both papers it is assumed that there are technology spillovers between countries, but that free riding countries to some extent can be excluded from these spillovers.
The issue in Carraro and Marchiori (2003) is whether or not negotiations on R&D cooperation and on emissions reductions should be linked. They derive conditions under which a linkage of these two issues is an equilibrium of the negotiation game. Buchner and Carraro (2004) use a numerical model to study the properties of an agreement only on R&D cooperation, and not explicitly on 3 emissions reductions. They show that if a sufficiently large part of the technology spillovers can be limited to the cooperating countries, all countries will wish to participate in the R&D agreement. However, the numerical model used suggests that the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions will be higher under such an agreement than in the case of no cooperation.
None of the articles listed above focus explicitly, however, on how the design of an international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions might affect the incentives for technology development. This is one of the issues treated in Golombek and Hoel (2003) , where it is assumed that R&D investments in each country are beneficial also for other countries through technology spillovers 2 .
Various types of non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes are studied. In particular, the paper compares different types of climate agreements that regulate emissions, but don't include policies towards R&D investments. The justification for this limitation of the agreements, which is in contrast to what is assumed in Carraro and Marchiori (2003) and Buchner and Carraro (2004) , is that policies affecting R&D expenditures are difficult to verify by other countries. If a country is required -through an international agreement -to have more R&D expenditures than what is individually optimal for the country, it will be relatively easy for the country to have less R&D than required by the agreement, but to report other expenditures and/or other policies as R&D activities/policies.
In Golombek and Hoel (2003) it is assumed that R&D expenditures in each country are controlled directly by the government. This assumption reflects that the incentives for any particular firm to undertake R&D expenditures are weak due to technology spillovers -both between countries and between domestic firms. The government must therefore finance the R&D activities, even though 4 R&D (primarily) takes place in private firms. The government thus controls R&D expenditures through its funding of them. In the present paper we explicitly consider this funding. All R&D is assumed to take place in private firms, but the R&D investments are subsidized by the government. The purpose of the present paper is therefore to study climate policy when R&D takes place in private firms and there are technology spillovers between countries, but there is no instrument to correct for these international externalities. In particular, we compare the properties of different types of international climate agreements when the positive externalities from R&D are not regulated through the climate agreement. By explicitly modeling R&D investments in private firms we derive several results that have not been derived before.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model in more detail. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we use a static framework, thus ignoring, for example, the fact that GHG emissions are stock pollutants. We also consider only one type of GHG, namely CO 2 . None of our results are affected by this simplification. Moreover, all types of uncertainties -like the rate of return on R&D investments -are disregarded.
Finally, all countries are assumed identical, and all firms within each country are also identical. While this of course is a drastic simplification, the analysis nevertheless gives insight that is relevant also in the real world.
In Section 3 we consider the first-best social optimum. This gives a particular abatement level, and a particular level of R&D investments in each firm. This outcome could be implemented through an ideal international agreement that sets a common carbon tax to be used in all countries, as well as a common subsidy rate for R&D investments for all firms in all countries.
Sections 4-6 consider three types of international agreements that regulate emissions, but don't include policies towards R&D investments (the justification for this limitation of the agreements was given above). Sections 4 and 5 consider an international agreement controlling abatements directly through emission quotas. In our simple model with identical countries, it makes no difference whether quotas are non-tradable (Section 4) or tradable (Section 5). We show that the equilibrium R&D subsidy is lower than the socially optimal subsidy if there are technology spillovers across countries. The equilibrium subsidy is even lower if the climate agreement does not specify emission levels directly, but instead imposes a common carbon tax faced by all firms in all countries (Section 6).
In the model there are 3 levels of decision makers; (i) the group of all countries in the world, (ii) each country and (iii) firms. In Section 4-6 we study the optimal policy of a country when the climate agreement is taken as given and the country takes into account how domestic and foreign firms will respond to its policy decisions. In Section 7-9 we study the optimal design of climate agreements. We assume that all types of agreements are designed by the group of all countries in order to minimize total social costs, given how countries will respond to the climate agreement (and how firms will respond to the policy decisions of countries).
In Sections 7 and 8 we study how strictly emissions should be regulated in the climate agreement. For the quota case, emissions should be regulated so that marginal abatement costs are higher than the sum of marginal environmental costs in all countries. In the case of an emission tax agreement, it is not obvious whether the common emission tax should be higher or lower than the sum of marginal environmental costs. Under a reasonable assumption about the abatement cost function, however, the common emission tax should be lower than the sum of marginal environmental costs. With this condition on the cost function we also find that the levels of abatement and R&D investments are 6 lower under the optimal tax agreement than under the optimal quota agreement.
Under the tax agreement the levels of abatement and R&D investments are also lower than in the first-best optimum.
Section 9 compares total social costs of climate agreements. The second-best agreements will necessarily have higher social costs than the first-best outcome. We show that total social costs are higher in the tax case than in the quota case. Finally, Section 10 sums up our main findings and points at topics for future research.
The model
We assume there are m firms in each of n countries. All firms are identical and undertake R&D investments. As a simplification, we neglect uncertainties and dynamic aspects of R&D as well as patents. We assume the technology level of a particular domestic firm depends on its own R&D investments (X), the amount of R&D investments in the other firms in that country (x), as well as 
In (1) (1). The assumptions used by Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1994) and Xepapadeas (1995) correspond to the limiting case of * 1 γ = , while the assumptions used by e.g. Buonanno et al. (2000 Buonanno et al. ( , 2003 and Rosendahl (2002) correspond to * 1 γ < .
Although spillovers often are modeled as in (1), it is not obvious that this is the best way of modeling technology spillovers between firms and countries. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) have argued that the ability of a firm to learn from other firms may depend on its own R&D effort. Graevenitz (2002) discusses the policy implications of whether one models spillovers additively as in (1) or in a similar way as Cohen and Levinthal suggest. We shall stick to the "standard" formulation (1).
The technology level of a particular foreign firm ( * Y ) is determined in a similar way as (1):
In (2) the first term is R&D investment in the particular foreign firm, the second term shows the spillover effect from the other ("foreign") firms in the same country, the third term shows the spillover effect from all other foreign firms, whereas the last term shows the spillover effect from the "domestic" firms. A particular domestic firm minimizes its total costs by choosing abatement (A) and R&D investments (X). Hence, the firm minimizes
where the second term is net R&D expenditures, the third term is environmental costs of the firm, and the technology level Y is given by (1). All 
From (4) and (5) we see that the technology level of domestic firms y , as well as abatement a, depend on σ and q, whereas (6) and (7) 
6 Throughout the paper, we assume interior equilibrium outcomes for a and x, which will be the case for suitable assumptions on the function c(a,y).
It follows from the properties of the abatement cost function that all of these four functions are increasing in both their arguments.
As both y and * y depend on R&D investments undertaken in all countries, see (1) and (2), we have (using X=x and X*=x*)
Hence, if the domestic government changes its R&D subsidy, R&D investments will be affected in all (domestic and foreign) firms, and the technology level of domestic firms will change. Note, however, that the technology level of foreign firms will not change since for a foreign firm costs of production, that is, costs of R&D investments and the price of carbon, have not changed, see (10). Similarly, a change in the foreign R&D subsidy will affect R&D investments in all (domestic and foreign) firms as well as the technology level of foreign firms, but has no impact on the technology level of domestic firms.
For the proceeding analysis, it is useful to have an explicit expression for (12).
This follows from (1) and (2) (and X=x, X*=x*, Y=y and Y*=y*):
where
The following properties can be derived from the expressions above: 
Relation (17) is minimized with respect to x subject to the definition of technology level, which can now be written as (see (14) for the case of
where H is given by (16).
For given abatements, the first order condition for the first-best optimum is 7 For γ*=γ we find (5) together with (19) we see that the social optimum can be implemented by imposing the subsidy
on all firms. We immediately see from (20) and the properties of H that the optimal subsidy is zero for the special case of no spillovers (γ=γ*=0).
Moreover, the optimal subsidy is larger the larger are the diffusion parameters γ and
Proposition 1: The optimal subsidy of R&D investments is higher the greater are the technology spillovers within countries and across countries.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is straightforward; the higher the rate of diffusion, the more beneficial are R&D investments in one firm for all other firms. As the social return on R&D investments increases, the optimal level of R&D investments increases, which requires a higher technology subsidy.
Finally, note that the subsidy is constant, and hence independent of the abatement level a as well as the technology level y. This is due to H in (20) being independent of both a and y, which reflects the additive structure of (1).
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An international agreement on abatement
In this section we assume there is an international agreement that specifies abatement levels in all countries. These levels are implemented through country specific emission taxes (or through country specific tradable emission quota systems). Hence, (4) and (6) 
with respect to the technology subsidy σ (see (8) - (13)), taking a as given.
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The first order condition is (using (8) and (14) 
From (20) and (24) As noted above, when abatements are given and there is international technology diffusion, in the non-cooperative equilibrium increased domestic R&D investments are offset by decreased R&D investments in foreign firms. In the first best optimum, the full social effect of R&D investments are taken into account, and hence the optimal technology level is higher in the first best case than in the non-cooperative case. Thus, the technology subsidy should be highest in the first best optimum. Without international spillover effects, there is no leakage in the non-cooperative equilibrium, and hence the technology level, as well as the subsidy, should not differ between the first best optimum and the non-cooperative equilibrium.
International tradable emission quotas
In this section we assume that all countries have signed an international climate agreement of the Kyoto type. The agreement specifies the initial distribution of emission quotas between countries, but allows countries to buy or sell quotas from/to other countries. The agreement imposes no restrictions on how the country sets its technology subsidy (or other environmental instruments). The 16 agreement only dictates that emissions should not exceed the country's quotas (i.e. initial endowment adjusted for quotas purchased or sold).
Let E be total emission quotas given to the "domestic" country. We assume that an international market for quotas is established, with an equilibrium price p for quotas. Obviously, the quota price will be lower the more quotas are given to the countries.
The domestic country minimizes
with respect to abatement a and technology subsidy σ . In (25) the last term shows net environmental costs as [ (1 ) ]
is the country's net purchase of quotas. Because all countries are identical, also with respect to the initial distribution of emission quotas, in equilibrium net purchase of quotas is zero for all countries. Hence, even if the number of identical countries is so low that each country can be considered to be "large" (that is, the country takes into account that the quota price depends on its own decisions), for each country
] 0 dp dp m a E m a E da dσ − − = − − = in equilibrium.
The first order condition with respect to abatement is With both types of agreements, R&D investments are determined according to (5) and (7), that is, investments depend on the technology subsidy, which has the same value in the two cases, and investments are also dependent on abatement. Hence, if abatements (at the firm level) do not differ between the two types of agreements, R&D investments will be equal under the two agreements. We have thus shown the following: 
A harmonized domestic carbon tax
In the previous section we discussed the case of an agreement with direct limits on national emissions. In this section we analyze an agreement that does not specify emission levels for the participating countries. Instead, the agreement specifies policy instruments that the countries must implement domestically.
Below we study the case where there is a common domestic carbon tax τ that all countries must implement. We assume that in each country the carbon tax revenue of the government is redistributed domestically.
In the previous case, total emissions (aggregated over all participating countries) followed directly from the agreement. In the present case, we assume that each country determines abatement taking into account environmental costs of emissions. 
The first order condition with respect to the subsidy is
where we have used (14) and (28).
From (5) and (29) we find that the equilibrium subsidy σ now is given by
Consider the last term in (30). Without any agreement this term would be zero: the (domestic) tax rate would be equal to the marginal benefit of abatement D′ .
However, in the present case the common tax rate τ will in general be higher than the tax rate the country would have chosen without any agreement. Both .The last term in (30) is therefore negative. Comparing with (24) it therefore follows that σ σ < .
We have thus shown the following:
Proposition 5: The equilibrium subsidy of R&D investments under a harmonized domestic carbon tax is lower than the corresponding subsidy under an agreement on abatement/tradable emission quotas.
The interpretation of this result is directly linked to the first term in (29). The common tax rate τ will in general be higher than the tax rate the country would have chosen without any agreement. Hence, the level of abatement is 20 distorted away from the country's ideal choice. Because the term (
positive, and since increased R&D increases abatement, increased R&D also increases this distortion. This gives each country a smaller incentive to subsidize R&D investments than when such investments have no effect on the countries' abatement levels.
The second-best optimal price of carbon
So far, we have considered different types of agreements, without saying anything about how abatement levels are determined. We have shown that whatever the abatement level and tax rate is, the equilibrium subsidy of R&D investments is lower in a tax agreement than in a quota agreement. Moreover, under both types of agreements the equilibrium subsidies are lower than in the first-best optimum. In this section we shall investigate whether this property of both agreements should affect what the optimal quota/tax should be in the two types of agreements. Whatever the type of agreement, we assume that the agreement is designed (by the group of signatories) in order to minimize total social costs aggregated over all identical firms, that is, [ ( , ) ] ( (1 ) 
which is the standard requirement that marginal costs of abatement should equal total marginal benefit of abatement. Hence, from a first best perspective the price of carbon in an agreement should equal total marginal benefits of abatement nD′ .
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According to Propositions 3 and 5, the subsidies under both types of secondbest agreements (since R&D subsidies are not included in the agreement) are lower than the subsidy in the first best case (assuming positive technology spillovers across countries). Should the second-best agreement therefore be designed so that the price of carbon is higher than the optimal tax in the first best optimum (to adjust for the difference in the R&D subsidy)? To answer this, we must consider the two types of agreements separately.
Consider first the quota agreement. In this case the common technology level in all countries is determined by (23), which give y as an increasing function of a: y=y(a). In the minimization of (31) with respect to a we must now take into account that y=y(a) and x=Hy(a) (from (18)). Instead of (32) we therefore now
nD c H y a nD
where the inequality sign follows from 
Proposition 6: In an optimally designed quota agreement of the type discussed in Sections 4 and 5, the abatement level is set so that the price of carbon (i.e., the marginal abatement cost) exceeds the sum of the marginal environmental costs.
We next turn to the case of a tax agreement of the type discussed in Section 6. In this case the abatement level is endogenously determined in each country by equation (28). We can write this as The optimal value of y (and therefore also the subsidy rate σ) will obviously depend on the common tax rate τ. We saw above that when the agreement directly specified the abatement level, y was larger the larger was a. We might therefore expect that in the present case y is increasing in τ. This is, however, not necessarily the case. In Appendix 1 we show the following:
Proposition 7: The equilibrium level of R&D investments under a harmonized domestic carbon tax is lower the higher is the tax rate if
2 ( , ) 0 a y y τ τ ∂ > ∂ ∂ . If D''=0, 2 ( , ) 0 a y y τ τ ∂ < ∂ ∂
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium level of R&D investments to be increasing in the tax rate.
From this proposition it is clear that y may very well be lower the higher is τ:
is positive if the rightward shift, measured horizontally, in the marginal abatement cost curve is larger the higher up on this curve we are initially. 10 This seems to be more plausible than the opposite case. We should therefore expect less R&D investments the higher is the common tax rate. 
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Notice also that if R&D investments are reduced as a response to a higher tax, the subsidy rate must also be lower the higher is the tax. This follows immediately from
equations (8)- (11) and the discussion after these. If the common tax rate goes up, and as a response to this all countries either leave their R&D subsidies unchanged or increase their subsidies, both abatement and technology levels will increase in all countries. A higher technology level in all countries requires increased R&D in all countries, which contradicts that R&D investments are reduced as a response to a higher tax.
The reason why countries might respond to an increased common carbon tax by reducing their R&D subsidies is related to with the discussion after Proposition 5: A higher common carbon tax increases each country's distortion of its abatement level away from its ideal choice. Reducing R&D subsidies reduces abatement (cet. par.), and therefore mitigates this increased distortion.
For an optimal quota agreement, the marginal abatement cost was higher than the sum of marginal environmental costs. The reason for this was that higher abatement gave more R&D investments. For a tax agreement we should therefore expect that if a higher tax gives lower abatement, the optimal tax should be lower than the sum of marginal environmental costs. This is indeed the case. The optimal tax is found by minimizing (31) The first order condition is
11 Note that (31) does not distinguish between domestic and foreign firms. We can use this expression because with a common price of carbon the response to a change in an instrument does not differ between domestic and foreign firms.
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where we have used (28). Combining this with (34) gives, after some straightforward derivations 
Second best abatement and technology levels
In the previous section we found the optimal price of carbon under a quota agreement and under a harmonized domestic carbon tax. We showed that under a quota agreement the price of carbon should exceed the sum of the marginal environmental costs, that is, the Pigovian level. On the other hand, with a harmonized carbon tax the price of carbon should be lower than the Pigovian (8)- (11), we have demonstrated the following: Note that the last part of Proposition 9 follows directly from the first part because lower technology level in all firms implies lower R&D investments in all (identical) firms.
We now compare the outcome of the international agreements with the firstbest social optimum. Proposition 3 and 5 imply that the equilibrium subsidy of R&D investments under a harmonized domestic carbon tax is lower than the first-best optimal subsidy. Moreover, from Proposition 8 we know that the price of carbon under a harmonized domestic carbon tax is lower than the firstbest price of carbon (the Pigovian level), provided that As mentioned above, we have showed that under a quota agreement the price of carbon should exceed the Pigovian level, see Proposition 6. Moreover, from Proposition 3 we know that the equilibrium subsidy under quotas is lower than in the first-best optimum (provided there are technology spillovers across countries). Because both abatement and technology level are increasing in the technology subsidy and the price of carbon, it is not obvious how abatement and technology levels are in the optimal quota agreement compared with the first-best levels. In Appendix 2 we show the following: 
Social costs of second-best climate agreements
In the previous two sections, we have compared the two types of international agreements, provided both are (second-best) optimally designed. We also compared both types of agreements with the first-best optimum. Obviously, both types of second-best climate agreements give higher social costs than the first-best outcome. We have, however, not yet discussed which of the two types 27 of second-best agreements give the lowest total costs. Given the results in the two previous sections, the comparison of total costs is easily illustrated by (19) is given by equation (19): It tells us which technology level maximizes social welfare given any abatement level. Clearly, this curve must go through all vertical tangents to the iso-welfare curves. Moving outwards along (19) in the northeast direction is like hiking along a ridge that drops off directly north and directly south. The position of this ridge is independent of the environmental damage function D. However, the position of the summit (given by F in Figure 1) , and also the steepness along the ridge to both sides of the summit, depend on the function D as F is determined by (19) and (32). (23) must lie below the line defined by (19). The highest possible social welfare obtainable given that we must lie on (23) is given by the point Q(uota) in Figure 1 , and must obviously give a lower welfare level than the point F. We have drawn the curves so that Q lies below F, which must be the case if international spillovers are sufficiently low (cf. Proposition 11). In the Figure, Q lies to the right of F, but it follows from Proposition 11 that the opposite is also possible. The right-hand side is larger than h, cf. the discussion after (30). It follows that the line defined by (29) must lie below the line defined by (29) . 12 The highest possible social welfare obtainable given that we must lie on (29) is given by the point T(ax) in Figure 1 , and must obviously give a lower welfare level than the point Q. We have drawn the curves so that T lies below and to the left of F and Q, which must be the case if 
Concluding remarks
We have studied two types of international climate agreements that do not include R&D policies. Without international technology spillovers, these agreements would be equivalent, and both could give the first-best outcome. In the presence of international technology spillovers, it is not possible to reach the first-best outcome with either of these agreements. One reason is that the R&D subsidies that are optimal for an individual country under an agreement are too low compared with the subsidies that must be imposed in order to reach the first-best outcome.
Although both types of agreements are inferior compared with the first-best outcome, under an optimally designed quota agreement global emissions may be lower than in the first-best outcome. Under an optimally designed tax agreement, emissions are -under a reasonable assumption -higher than under a quota agreement and higher than in the first-best outcome.
We concluded that with optimally designed agreements a quota agreement was preferable to a tax agreement as the first gives lower social costs. Compared with the tax agreement, the quota agreement has higher R&D subsidies and (under a reasonable assumption) higher abatement.
Our results suggest that with international spillovers, there is a social loss of not including R&D policies in an international climate agreement. In the Introduction, we argued that one reason for not including R&D policies in an 30 agreement is difficulties in monitoring compliance of this element of an agreement. However, even if it is difficult or impossible to design a first-best type of agreement, our results suggest that agreements where R&D policies are included in an imperfect manner may be superior to agreements that ignore R&D policies. Moreover, the implicit assumption in our model that there are no problems with monitoring and/or compliance with respect to policy instruments and emissions is obviously also a simplification. Some economists, including Barrett (2003) , have argued that traditional agreements of the quota type discussed in the present paper are inherently flawed, due to large free rider incentives. Barrett argues (op.cit, chapter 15) that agreements that to a larger degree focus on the development of new technology might be more likely to be successful than traditional quota type agreements.
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An interesting topic for future research would be to examine various types of agreements that include R&D policies under imperfect monitoring or incomplete compliance. In such a study it is important how the development of new technology is modeled. While we in the present paper have used the standard assumption of additive spillovers, a more sophisticated modeling would be to e.g. assume that for each firm spillovers from other firms have "decreasing returns" or that for each firm the benefits of R&D investments in other firms depend on the magnitude of its own R&D investments. The implications of different technology assumptions will be investigated in future research.
Appendix 1: The relationship between R&D investment and the common carbon tax rate
Denote the left hand side of (34) by ( ( , ) ) L L y τ = . We have 13 Cf. also the discussion of Buchner and Carraro (2004) 
The denominator of this expression is positive from the second order conditions.
Remembering that the environmental cost is ( (1 ) ( 1) 
follows from (34) that
The effect of a tax change on abatement in other countries is identical to the effect on abatement of the country we are considering, i.e. the sum of the direct effect and the effect via the technology level:
We can therefore rewrite (38) as (simplifying by writing a instead of ( , ) a y τ ):
From (28) , which imply that the second term in square brackets in (40) is zero. Using (38) we therefore have
Since the term in square brackets is positive, ' D τ > , and ( , ) a y τ is increasing in both arguments, Proposition 7 immediately follows.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 11
We know that if h=H, which will be the case if there are no international spillovers, the optimal quota agreement is identical to the first-best optimum. If we can identify in what direction abatement and technology levels change as h is increased (h>H when there are international spillovers), we therefore know how the quota agreement differs from the first-best optimum when there are international spillovers.
14 The optimal quota agreement is given by (23) 
The first two terms in D are positive, and will dominate the last term as long as h-H is sufficiently small. From (46) and our assumptions on the functions D and c it is therefore clear that as h increases, y will decline. This will be true at least for h close to H (but might also hold when h-H is large). As long as the international spillovers are sufficiently small, h-H will be small, so we can conclude that in this case the technology levels y are lower in the quota agreement than in the first-best optimum. Moreover, it follows directly from (45) that since we do not generally know the sign of y φ , we do not know whether abatement levels under the quota agreement are lower or higher than in the first-best optimum. This concludes the proof of Proposition 11. 
